The United Sections of the Court of Cassation reaffirmed that Italian citizenship by descent is acquired originally at the moment of birth and that the status of citizen, once acquired, is permanent and imprescriptible.
"Citizenship by reason of birth is acquired originally iure sanguinis, and the status of citizen, once acquired, is permanent, imprescriptible, and can be judicially protected at any time," says the released ruling. this Wednesday (29).
The conclusion appears in the decisions regarding the so-called "child issue". judged on April 14In a statement sent to Italianismo, the lawyer Marco Mellone, who worked on one of the cases, said that "the highest Italian civil court has once again emphasized that the right to Italian citizenship by descent is conferred at the moment of birth and is not subject to any time limit."
The timing is noteworthy. Just a few days earlier, on July 23, the Constitutional Court had sent a question to the Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxembourg regarding the legal framework underpinning the 2025 reform: the so-called "original preclusion" of citizenship acquisition.
The new law will now be reviewed by the European Union's courts. And there are European precedents that strengthen the defense of descendants.
- New legal front opened
- Processes can still be filed.
- Individual analysis of your case.
The Court of Cassation did not rule on the validity of the Tajani Law. However, the reaffirmation that citizenship is inherent in a person puts the legal distinction upon which Article 3-bis is based under renewed pressure.
What the Cassation Office stated
The cases examined by the United Sections involved the former “minor issueThat is, the discussion about the loss of citizenship of minor children after the foreign naturalization of one of the parents.
In reconstructing the Italian system, however, the Court reaffirmed general principles of citizenship by right of blood (jure sanguinis).
According to the Sezioni Unite, citizenship by birth is acquired originally, and the status, once acquired, is permanent and imprescriptible. It is up to the descendant to demonstrate the acquisition and the line of transmission. Any event capable of interrupting this chain must be proven by the person alleging it.
The Court also ruled that Article 3-bis of Law 91/1992 does not apply to lawsuits filed before March 27, 2025, which remain governed by the previous legislation. The official summary of the Cassation itself records this principle.
This is also the limit of the decision: the Cassation Office did not declare the Tajani Law invalid, nor did it preclude its application to actions filed after the cut-off date.
Where does the tension arise with the Tajani Law?
Article 3-bis establishes that certain descendants born abroad, including those born before the reform, and holding other citizenships, are considered not to have acquired Italian citizenship, except in the exceptions provided for by law.
In Sentenza 63/2026, the Constitutional Court classified this mechanism as a “preclusione originaria all'acquisto”, that is, an original impediment to acquisition, and not as a loss of previously acquired citizenship. The Constitutional Court considered this construction valid when examining Article 3-bis.
It is precisely at this point that the rationale behind the United Sections becomes important.
On one hand, the reform considers that certain people never acquired citizenship. On the other hand, the revocation reaffirms the jurisprudence according to which, given the legal requirements, the status is acquired originally at birth.
The annulment did not resolve this conflict regarding the Tajani Law. But it reaffirmed the legal premise used by those who contest the reform.
The question now lies with Luxembourg.
The discussion took on a new dimension with Ordinance 147/2026.
The Constitutional Court asked the Court of Justice of the European Union whether European law allows national legislation to impose this original preclusion on persons born abroad before the entry into force of the new rule, who hold another citizenship and are not covered by the legal exceptions.
The Constitutional Court's decision changed the landscape. The new citizenship law will now be reviewed by the European Union's courts of justice.
Therefore, Luxembourg will have to examine precisely the most delicate point of the reform: The question is whether a subsequent law can treat as not acquired a citizenship that, according to traditional Italian jurisprudence, is originally acquired by the person.
It is in this discussion that the reaffirmation now made by the United Sections can gain weight.
Mellone highlights precisely this aspect when stating that the Cassation Court has once again recognized that the right to citizenship by descent is conferred at birth and "is not subject to any time limit."
What the decision did not do
There is an important limit.
The Constitutional Court itself had already noted, in Ordinance 147/2026, that the question submitted to the United Sections did not concern the validity or application of Law 74/2025 to those born before the reform, but rather the interpretation of the former Law 555/1912.
Therefore, the new decisions do not overturn the Tajani Law, do not suspend Article 3-bis, and do not guarantee victory for anyone who files a lawsuit now.
The effect is different.
They reinforce, at the highest level of ordinary Italian jurisdiction, the concept that citizenship iure sanguinis is acquired at birth and that subsequent judicial recognition does not create this status, but declares a pre-existing legal situation.
Now, this concept will be in the background of the discussion that has reached the European Courts of Justice.
Another point still open.
The situation remains without a definitive answer for those who attempted to begin the citizenship recognition process before March 27, 2025, but were unable to formally submit the application or obtain an appointment.
The Constitutional Court itself left this issue out of Sentenza 63/2026. The topic gained traction after Ordinanza 13818/2026 of the Cassation, which recognized that administrative obstacles capable of preventing even the submission of the request can justify recourse to the courts.
This could be another area of contention regarding the reform, especially in cases where there is evidence of concrete attempts prior to the cutoff date.
For now, the situation is simpler: Tajani's law remains in effect, but the debate over its application to people who were born before the reform is far from over.
And the central issue now lies in Luxembourg.
