The European Commission opened two infringement procedures against Portugal last Wednesday (15). due to failures in adopting European rules on migration.The country failed to transpose two directives within the deadline: the Single Authorisation Directive, related to the residence and work of third-country nationals, and the Reception Conditions Directive, which establishes standards for applicants for international protection.
At first glance, the Portuguese case has nothing to do with the Italian citizenshipAnd, legally, these are quite different situations. But the episode helps to understand an issue that also appears in the debate about Law 74/2025, known as the Tajani Decree: how far does the autonomy of a Member State go when its decisions produce effects related to European Union law?
In the case of Portugal, the answer is simpler. Migration policy is also an area regulated by European standards. When a country fails to transpose a directive within the deadline, the European Commission can initiate infringement proceedings, which, in later stages, can reach the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
With citizenship, the scenario is different.
The definition of who acquires or loses nationality remains, in principle, the responsibility of each Member State. There is no European directive determining who should be considered an Italian citizen. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the European Commission could simply open proceedings against Italy for disagreeing with the new rules introduced by Law 74/2025.
But national competence does not mean absolute freedom either.
No European Union member state legislates on an island.
The Court of Justice of the European Union has already addressed this issue in important cases. In Rottmann, by 2010, and TjebbesIn 2019, the CJEU established parameters for situations in which national decisions on loss of nationality also result in the loss of Union citizenship and the rights associated with it.
More recently, in the case involving Malta's citizenship-by-investment program, decided in 2025The Court once again addressed the limits of states' autonomy in this matter. The central point is that nationality remains under national jurisdiction, but its exercise is not necessarily isolated from the European legal order when obligations arising from participation in the Union are at stake.
It is in this space that a European discussion about the Tajani Decree may arise.
The issue, however, is legally more complex than in classic cases of loss of citizenship. The new Italian legislation seeks to establish that certain people born abroad and holding another citizenship have not acquired Italian citizenship, except for the exceptions provided for by law.
Any potential challenge under European law would therefore have to address a prior and crucial question: were these people already Italian citizens from birth, according to the legislation in force at that time, or can the Italian state subsequently redefine the conditions under which that citizenship is considered acquired?
If the first interpretation prevails, it opens the door to arguing that a subsequent legislative change would not simply be regulating a new acquisition of citizenship, but interfering with a legal status that already existed. In this scenario, the discussion could arise regarding the effects of this intervention on European Union citizenship as well.
If the second interpretation prevails, the possibility of intervention by European law is likely to encounter greater obstacles.
This is why precedents such as Rottmann and Tjebbes cannot be treated as ready-made answers against the Tajani Decree. They did not decide a situation identical to that created by the Italian reform. They serve, however, as references for a broader discussion on the limits that Union law can impose when national decisions on nationality matters affect European citizenship.
The argument would still need to be effectively presented before the Court of Justice of the European Union, possibly through a preliminary ruling by a national court. There is no guarantee that... Luxembourg I would adopt an interpretation favorable to the descendants.
The case of Portugal therefore serves as a contextual example, and not as a precedent for Italian citizenship. It shows that European integration imposes different levels of limitation on the autonomy of states. In some matters, such as those directly regulated by directives, the Commission's oversight is clear and immediate. In others, such as nationality, competence remains national, but its effects may, under certain circumstances, fall under Union law.
Italy had the power to legislate on its citizenship and chose to do so. The question that remains open is another: what are the limits of this power when a legislative change affects previously established situations and produces consequences that may also extend to European citizenship?
While this discussion remains in the realm of legal possibilities, the main battle continues within Italy itself. Constitutional Court Ruling 63/2026 has already addressed points of the new regulation, while the legal community... awaits the decision of the Sezioni Unite of the Court of Cassation on key issues related to citizenship by descent, and also on new questions before the Constitutional Court.
The issue thus has two distinct dimensions. In Italy, the interpretation, constitutionality, and effects of the new rules are being debated. At the European level, a broader question remains, which could gain relevance if it reaches the CJEU: to what extent can a State's jurisdiction over its own citizens be exercised when its effects reach rights protected by the European Union legal system?
Portugal does not offer an answer to the Tajani Decree. But the move from Brussels helps to remind us that, within the European Union, the word of a member state is not always necessarily the final one.
By Reginaldo Maia, with information from SIC Noticias
